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Legitimate Invasions: Lessons from the History of
Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation
Ellie Marshall*
INTRODUCTION
The growth of modern surveillance has attracted great public and scholarly
interest. As Justice Abella recently noted in Douez v. Facebook, the Internet has
transformed the potential harms flowing from an unjustified invasion of one’s
personal information.1 Most analyses of the associated risks, however, imply that
the techniques and motivations for surveillance are new. In fact, tactics for
collecting and exchanging information about individuals to gain power over
those individuals are well documented since time immemorial.2 From William
the Conquerer’s Domesday Book to IBM’s first census tabulating machine, the
advantage gained through data sharing has greatly benefited the state.3 The
history of surveillance, however, is not solely a history of government
surveillance. The explosion of commercial and consumer credit, the ‘‘vital air
of the system of commerce,” in the 19th century transformed surveillance by
perfecting the process of flattening an individual’s identity into a monetizable
reputation.4 Collecting and exchanging personal information became the artillery
of the private sector, a necessity for growth and market saturation. Today, we are
deeply accustomed to having our identities tested and our personal stories
collected in commercial settings, taking for granted the infrastructures that trade
them, and their justifications for doing so. In our highly mediated, digital
economy, there is often no alternative to these legitimate invasions.5
* J.D. University of Toronto, Faculty of Law; M.Sc. Social Science of the Internet,
University of Oxford. The author wishes to thank Simon Stern for supervising the first
draft of this article as a Directed Research project at the University of Toronto. The
author would also like to thank the editors of the Canadian Journal of Law and
Technology for their helpful feedback and input.
1 Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, 2017 CarswellBC 17663, 2017 CarswellBC 1664,
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, 411 D.L.R. (4th) 434 (S.C.C.) [Douez].
2 DianeRowland,UtaKohl &AndrewCharlesworth, Information Technology Law (New
York: Routledge, 2017) at 331.
3 Ibid, citing UK, HL, Parliamentary Debates, vol 549, col 37 (11 October 1993) (Earl
Ferrers).
4 Josh Lauer, Creditworthy: A History of Consumer Surveillance and Financial Identity in
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017) at 27, citing Senator David
Webster, ‘‘TheContinuance of the BankCharter” inTheWritings and Speeches of David
Webster (Boston: Little, Brown, 1834).
5 Douez, supra note 1, at para 111, citing Cheryl B Preston, ‘‘‘Please Note: You Have
WaivedEverything’: CanNoticeRedeemOnlineContracts?” (2015) 64AmULRev 535
at 554.
Many suggestions for protecting individuals from the harms posed by our
‘‘always-on” lifestyles focus on interventions from privacy law. However, the
post-Internet-era fixation on privacy is problematic because without a clear
definition of what privacy means, the discussion often becomes about
‘‘protecting privacy for privacy’s sake.”6 A privacy-only approach is also a-
historic. The interests protected under the umbrella term of privacy have
historically been addressed through multiple legal schemes, such as regulating
eavesdropping, trade, statistics, labour relations, and even psychiatry. One
particularly overlooked area of law by those interested in the recent rise of
‘‘platform capitalism” is consumer protection.7 Reviving an interest in consumer
protection is essential, as it can help us understand a critical problem with
modern surveillance where privacy law has failed: how to provide meaningful
choice to individuals whose data is collected by commercial platforms and shared
with third parties.8
To highlight the need for a renewed commitment to consumer protection,
this paper traces the history of consumer reporting legislation in Ontario and
connects the debates surrounding its enactment to current power imbalances and
limitations in Canadian data protection laws. Although consumer reporting
statutes are quite similar across Canada, Ontario is a helpful case study given the
high concentration of both technology companies and people in the province.9
This exercise is also helpful because there are few histories of consumer
surveillance in Canada.10 History, and legal history in particular, enables us to
‘‘excavate the past” to discover that there is nothing inherent or essential about
6 EdwardRyan,Report on protection of privacy inOntario (Toronto:OntarioLawReform
Commission, 1968) at 6.
7 This paper adopts the definition of ‘‘platform capitalism” in Nick Srnicek, Platform
Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017) at 6 (‘‘The platform has emerged as a new
business model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data, and
with this shift we have seen the rise of large monopolistic firms. Today the capitalism of
the high- and middle-income economies is increasingly dominated by [platforms]); See
alsoLauer, supranote 4 at 298:while the gravity of current eventsmake it difficult to view
contemporary surveillance in its broader historical context, inattention to historicmodes
of data protection is curious given the field’s grounding in the works ofMaxWeber and
Michel Foucault.
8 FrankPasquale, ‘‘Reforming theLawofReputation” (2016) 47LoyUChicagoLJ 515 at
516.
9 See, e.g., ‘‘Ontario tech sector booms as Trudeau’s innovation strategy starts taking
shape,” Financial Post (4 April 2017), online:<business.financialpost.com/technology/
ontario-tech-sector-booms-as-trudeaus-innovation-strategy-starts-taking-shape>.
10 There is no academic publishing on the topic of consumer surveillance in Canada before
computerization. For an excellent treatment of the impact of contemporary surveillance
on Canadians, see Colin Bennett et al, eds, Transparent Lives: Surveillance in Canada
(Edmonton: Athabasca University Press, 2014). The most recent academic treatment of
Ontario’s Consumer Reporting Act was written in 2009 and does not provide historical
context. See Kent Glowinski, ‘‘Don’t Get Enough Credit – The Need for an Impartial
Consumer Credit Report Appeal Tribunal in Ontario” (2009) 22 J L & Soc Pol’y 5.
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technology and that there are ‘‘legitimately different ways to think about things,
including legal order.”11 Focusing only on recent and emerging strategies —
algorithmic decision-making, the proliferation of sensors, blockchain — risks
taking the current distribution of rights in society for granted. This is important
because modern surveillance raises not only privacy problems, but other human
rights concerns, such as sorting already marginalized populations by predictions
of risk12 and limiting public participation in decision-making processes.13
Further, a consumer law approach to the challenges posed by modern data
sharing practices allows us to see that the concepts underpinning privacy, such as
the right to be left alone, are not only about controlling access to core
biographical information. The principles underlying our human rights
frameworks also support a right to not conform to a unitary mode of
capitalism.14 Strong consumer protection frameworks are needed (alongside
privacy law) to recognize economic pluralism and to protect autonomy.
To explore this proposition, Part I outlines the rise of consumer reporting in
North America and describes the legislative history of Ontario’s Consumer
Reporting Act,15 which imported the imprecise ‘‘legitimate business need”
standard to justify the commercialization of identity in the context of social
anxiety over computerization in the 1960s. Part II discusses the current gap in
Ontario created by the federal private-sector privacy regime and the lack of
enforcement of provincial consumer protection law, using unregulated Canadian
artificial intelligence companies that score potential tenants as an example. Part
III applies lessons from this history to potential legal solutions to strengthen the
Consumer Reporting Act, highlighting the multiplicity of opportunities for
provincial legislatures to intervene and provide democratic legitimacy to the
practice of platform capitalism. The paper concludes by emphasizing how
privacy, consumer protection, and other areas of law must intersect and inform
each other in the pursuit of stronger statutory protections of human rights in the
twenty-first century.
11 Jim Phillips, ‘‘Why Legal History Matters” (Lecture delivered at the Faculty of Law,
Victoria University of Wellington, 24 June 2010), (2010) 41 VUWLR 293 at 309
12 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, ‘‘The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions” (2014) 89:1 Wash L Rev 1.
13 See, e.g., ‘‘Algorithmic Transparency: End Secret Profiling,” Electronic Privacy
Information Centre, online: <www.epic.org/algorithmic-transparency/>.
14 Government of Canada, ‘‘Canada’s approach to advancing human rights,” online:
<international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/hu-
man_rights-droits_homme/advancing_rights-promouvoir_droits.aspx?lang=eng>
(‘‘PluralismandDiversity:Ourpolicies are guidedby thebelief that economicprosperity,
responsible governance and social well-being are all enhanced by efforts to build
inclusive and pluralistic societies that respect diversity.”).
15 R.S.O. 1990, c. C 33 [Consumer Reporting Act].
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I. HISTORY OF CONSUMER REPORTING LEGISLATION IN
ONTARIO
Jim Phillips explains that legal history teaches us four things about the law: it
is contingent on specific social contexts; it is capable of resisting dominant
interests; there is nothing inevitable or preordained about our legal order; and
there are many ways to think about law.16 In the case of consumer surveillance,
history allows us to understand how modern data protection laws connect
rationally and logically to the social, economic, and technological forces which
catalyzed the rise of consumer reporting.17 This history, however, is comprised of
many diverse problems, such as consumer discipline, the financialization of debt,
and bankruptcy, which are outside the scope of this paper. Instead, the purpose
here is to explain how the legal framework around the collection, use, and
disclosure of data about individuals in the consumer context developed. What
emerges from this history is an understanding that the enactors of consumer
reporting legislation faced three specific challenges, all of which remain today:
how to define the entities that collect, use, and disclose consumer data; what level
of transparency these entities owe their data subjects; and what degree of
privilege should be afforded to these commercial activities.18
A. Rise of Consumer Reporting in North America
19th Century
The history of compiling and selling access to the reputations and financial
standings of Canadians is deeply intertwined with the American experience.
Until the mid-19th century, credit evaluation was informal and personal.19 A
creditor could surveil his neighbours and lean on community opinion to
determine to whom to grant credit, but separating out ‘‘honest” debtors was
difficult. This issue was exposed in the financial crisis of 1837, when a ‘‘cascade
of defaulted debts” following major industrial expansion crippled the American
economy.20 In response, Lewis Tappan launched the Mercantile Agency in 1841
with the sole purpose of overcoming the problems of distance and
depersonalization in commercial credit.21 Tappan’s agency converted social
16 Phillips, supra note 11 at 295.
17 Lawrence Lessig’s pathetic dot theory posits that individuals are regulated by four
forces: law, social norms, themarket, and technical infrastructures. SeeLawrenceLessig,
Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2 (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
18 It is important to remember that data subjects are unlikely to be customers of data
brokerage.
19 This paper treats ‘‘consumer reports,” ‘‘credit evaluation,” ‘‘credit reports,” and ‘‘credit
scores” as synonyms for the collection, analysis, and disclose of personal information to
support consumerism. This is an oversimplification simplification of the development of
the industry and the issues which scoring itself poses.
20 Lauer, supra note 4 at 29.
21 Ibid.
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relationships into ‘‘disembodied and increasingly abstract forms of data”
through which individuals acquired a new identity: financial identity.22 Like
modern platform capitalists, Tappan transformed collected knowledge into a
centralized, subscription-based reporting service. Also, similar to modern data-
rich companies, the agency tightly controlled access to its data. Subscribers had
to travel to the agency’s offices where a clerk would summarize information from
ledgers without providing a copy.23
Despite Tappan’s best efforts, his agency and its competitors were subject to
leaks.24 This exposed the industry not only to reduced revenues, but a bigger
threat: libel suits. The industry successfully lobbied for their reports to be treated
as privileged communication between agency and subscriber.25 Strict
confidentiality and lack of deliberate malice immunized the industry from civil
liability for defamation, even where its data was inaccurate. This immunity
empowered the retail industry to take up the innovations of the commercial
credit reporting agency in the 1870s. Early consumer reporting organizations also
published highly confidential information in closely guarded ‘‘credit rating
books.”26 One of the first companies to do this, the Retail Credit Company (now
Equifax) would go door-to-door to collect information about consumers and
sold their complied data in ‘‘Merchant Guides” for $25.27 Consumer reporting,
however, added the direct experience of a retailer’s interactions with the
customer to an individual’s profile.28 When pooled with records from other
retailers, these insights created patterns of promptness, or struggle, with credit
obligations.
20th Century
By the early 20th century, consumer reporting agencies used an array of
techniques, including interviews, to extract and manage data, bringing
individuals ‘‘into networks of communication over which they had little
control or knowledge.”29 Entrance into this system was not optional. Further,
22 Ibid at 32.
23 Ibid at 33.
24 This issue, of course, continues to plague the industry. See Stacy Cowley & Tara Siegel
Bernard, ‘‘As Equifax Amassed Ever More Data, Safety Was a Sales Pitch” New York
Times (23 September 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/business/equifax-
data-breach.html?mcubz=0>.
25 The first major libel suit occurred in 1851 where a husband claimed he was barred from
purchasing goods because a local correspondent informed the Mercantile Agency that
his wife was about to file for divorce and alimony, reducing his assets. An agency
employeewas jailed for failing to provide the identity of the data collector. SeeReports of
the Four Leading Cases Against theMercantile Agency for Slander and Libel (NewYork:
Dun, Barlow & Vo, 1873).
26 Lauer, supra note 4 at 66.
27 Cowley & Siegel Bernard, supra note 24.
28 Lauer, supra note 4 at 69.
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the information obtained by consumer reporting agencies was increasingly
augmented by other forms of data.30 Linking these datasets was not a mistake or
simple technological affordance. The credit reporting industry purposefully set
out to ‘‘preach the doctrine that credit is character,” sustaining the future of their
business by embedding themselves in the moral fabric of capitalism.31
Josh Lauer writes that one of the most striking aspects of early consumer
reporting was that it generated so little public reaction.32 This may be because
credit surveillance was presented as a socially redeeming technology, commended
for its democratic approach to the treatment of customers. Individuals ‘‘assumed
equal rights” under the law of objective credit reporting and scoring.33
As post-war debt soared, new credit instruments such as retail store charge
cards and universal credit cards created immense demand for up-to-date credit
information.34 One of the biggest problems facing the industry, however, was
ensuring accuracy. Potential sources of inaccuracies included clerical errors in
books of creditors, unreliable gossip, malicious reports, confusion between
similar identities, consumer disputes reported as defaults, material mistakenly
placed in the wrong files by careless file-clerks, and errors missed by a busy
telephone reporter.35 Computerization was the industry’s answer. Sophisticated
digital scoring systems first emerged in the late 1950s.36 The subsequent
efficiencies and power gained by the industry was enormous. However, unlike the
first 90-odd years of the consumer reporting industry, this change did not go
unnoticed.
B. Public Response to Computerization
By the end of the 1960s, the reporting industry found itself ‘‘at the centre of a
public firestorm that left its benevolent self-image in tatters.”37 In 1966, a
29 Ibid at 125.
30 Ibid at 115. By late 1930s, the accumulated newspaper clippings of some credit bureaus
were considered a valuable resource in their own right. In 1938, Reader’s Digest
confirmed that ‘‘every possible source of information is used to keep this great reference
library alive.”
31 Ibid at 126.
32 Ibid 136.
33 Ibid at 131.
34 In 1965, the total indebtedness for all forms of consumer credit amounted to $7 billion,
an over eight-fold increase over 1948. See Jacob SZiegel, ‘‘ConsumerCredit Regulation:
A Canadian Consumer-Oriented Viewpoint” (1968) 68:3 Colum L Rev 488 at n 1.
35 DaleGibson& John Sharp,Privacy and commercial reporting agencies (Winnipeg: Legal
Research Institute of the University of Manitoba, 1968) at 15.
36 Lauer, supra note 4 at 185. Interestingly, the banking industry was better positioned,
financially and technologically, to lead computerization of credit data, but did not
because the industry’s attitude toward personal information was much more conserva-
tive.
37 Ibid at 212.
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congressional committee was established to investigate the privacy risks of a
central government database on citizens. It was through publicity of this inquiry
that the majority of Americans, and Canadians, discovered that the private-
sector databases which tracked their consumption were already online.38 The
reach of the industry shocked lawmakers throughout North America, and even
in the United Kingdom.39 As Lauer writes, ‘‘big brother had not arrived in the
guise of Orwellian technocrats, but rather as a business system for controlling
consumers.”40
By the end of the 1960s, Canadian consumers were equally concerned as their
American counterparts about the rise of computerized credit reporting and
scoring.41 For instance, a 1969 Toronto Daily Star article entitled ‘‘How your
credit rating follows you — everywhere,” raised alarm at the scale and speed at
which the industry operated.42 Despite the fact that the comparatively under-
resourced Canadian consumer reporting agencies were still far from
computerization,43 similar legislative committees and royal commissions on
privacy were established across Canada. The federal and provincial legislatures
quickly responded by enacting a ‘‘veritable cornucopia of new legislation.”44
C. Legal Responses to Computerized Consumer Reporting
Ontario’s first attempt to legislate in response to growing privacy concerns
was 1965’s Private Investigators and Security Guards Act, which enforced a
licensing regime on ‘‘private investigators.”45 Disappointingly, despite defining
38 At the 1966 hearings of the congressional subcommittee on computers and privacy, the
testimony of RAND Corporation’s Paul Baran, who pioneered the packet switching
technology underpinning internet protocols, shocked the committee. While explaining
that the bits and pieces of separate automated information systems the private sectorwas
already building were more dangerous than the single data bank the government was
only just contemplating, Baran was interrupted by Rep. Benjamin Rosenthal: ‘‘So the
point youmake is that even though the Government has not put their stamp of approval
on building this system it is growing on its ownbecause various groups are independently
developing its starting points?” Baran responded: ‘‘Precisely.”
39 The 1972 Younger Committee on Privacy identified three specific areas of concern: the
use of computers to compile personal profiles; their capacity to correlate information;
and the ease with which unauthorized access to data could be obtained, often from
remote sites. See Rowland, Kohl & Charlesworth, supra note 2 at 331.
40 Lauer, supra note 4 at 221.
41 The loss of privacy was dismissed by the Toronto Daily Star’s Financial Editor Jack
McArthur as a ‘‘journalistic fad,” in a 1964 article. McArthur, like modern platform
capitalists, suggested concerned citizens could simply choose not to participate: ‘‘If you
reallywant to protect your ‘‘privacy,” you cando it by not borrowing orbuying on time.”
See Jack McArthur, ‘‘You can get too private,” Toronto Daily Star (6 June 1964).
42 Sue Howden, ‘‘How your credit rating follows you — everywhere,” Toronto Daily Star
(21 June 1969) 76.
43 Jacob S Ziegel, ‘‘Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation: Trends and Problems”
(1973) 11:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 503 at 503.
44 Ziegel, ‘‘Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 34 at 498.
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investigations to include information into personal character, the statute
specifically exempted investigators who search for and disclose credit,
employment, or insurance information.46 In 1966, the Ontario Law Reform
Commission initiated a preliminary study into the nature of existing and growing
problems respecting the ‘‘right to privacy.”47 The resulting Ryan Report drew
heavily on the work of Alan Westin and framed privacy as a basic human
psychological and physiological need. Summarizing the anxiety of the time, it
warned against the ‘‘trend towards de-individualization” and predicted reduced
strength in claims based in privacy.48 The Ryan Report criticized the consumer
reporting industry’s invasive methods of data collection, noting that these
activities are carried out not to invade privacy but to serve economic interests,
‘‘which in turn afford the fundamental rationalization of ‘‘service to the general
prosperity.”49 Informed by the burgeoning consumer protection movement, the
Ryan Report centered the importance of economic pluralism:
The interests in not being made object of commercial advertising, the
interest in not being made an unwilling factor in market research, the
interest in not owning a car or telephone set or the interest generally in
being economically individualistic without being subject to either major
social disadvantage or the pressure of being thought to be eccentric by a
peer group.50
It also challenged the logic of the ‘‘general headings” under which the ‘‘assault on
privacy” was justified; economic efficiency, police efficiency, government
efficiency and social utility all represented an overwhelming pressure on ‘‘a
reordering of human values.”51
45 R.S.O. 1965, c. 102, s. 2 (defined as ‘‘a personwho investigates and furnishes information
for hire or reward, including a person who searches for and furnishes information as to
the personal character or actions of a person, or the character of business or occupation
of a person.”).
46 At a 1970 conference inLondon,University ofManitobaProfessor JohnSharp criticized
theAct’s fragmented approach to privacy and suggested that ‘‘every data bank should be
subject to a licensing requirement regardless of whether it is operated by a government
agency, insurance, finance or credit reporting company or other person.” See JM Sharp,
‘‘Some proposals for legislation in Canada” in RC Rowe, ed, Privacy, Computers and
You (Manchester: National Computing Centre Limited, 1972) at 130.
47 Ryan, supra note 6 at 1. The Law Reform Commission’s introduction described the
problem resulting from the potential use of data banks as: ‘‘the grave threat posed to all
free men and democratic institutions by modern technology and well-intentioned
government and commercial practices that expose the individual to public and
institutional scrutiny; that record and collate all his transactions; and that treat him as
an object to be manipulated in the attainment of public, social and economic goals.”
48 Ibid at 3.
49 Ibid at 4.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid at 10. Impressively, the Ryan Report also commented on the contextual nature of
information, noting that standards of privacy are relativistic, such that it is hard to know
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Federalism Debate
The Ryan Report explicitly called for legislative reform: ‘‘absent legal
regulation, dynamic norms of economic positivism almost invariably prevail over
the static norms of manners.”52 This pre-Charter review unsurprisingly spent
significant time mapping the federalism issue facing a provincial intervention.
Until this point, Ontario was reticent to participate in the growing challenge
posed by technology.53 Attorney-General Arthur Wishart indicated that the
province could legislate eavesdropping and the electronic items used for such
activities, but adhered to the position that wiretapping and electronic
surveillance should be handled at the federal level, as it is closely related to
criminal law.54 The Ryan Report, however, dismissed the objection to the
exercise of provincial powers, noting that, contrary to a prior report,
eavesdropping was not a crime at common law transferred to Parliament at
Confederation.55
The Ryan Report noted that none of the federal schemes purporting to
protect consumers were grounded in a view of privacy as a unified concept.56 The
Report concluded that the province had the power to intervene if legislation was
framed as directed at suppressing conditions calculated to favour the
development of crime, rather than at the actual punishment of crime. If
concerned with the quality of life, actions must equal the scope of the right at
stake:
If the objective is to grant protection to privacy that is reasonable under
the circumstances of any given case, then legislation must not only limit
the claim to privacy by this formula, but should also limit those
competing claims that are based upon considerations of public interest,
economic well-being, commercial expedience, control of anti-social
activities, and all the rest. Without creating parallel norms, particularly
in those areas with either a strong laissez-faire tradition or an
established set of distinctive institutional values, then the exceptions
what will actually ‘‘invade someone’s privacy.” For a comprehensive treatment of the
concept of privacy as contextual, see Helen Nissenbaum, ‘‘Privacy as Contextual
Integrity” (2004) 79 Wash L Rev 119.
52 Ryan, supra note 6 at 4.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid at 16. See alsoHowden, supra note 42.Wishart was operating under the assumption
that then-Justice Minister John Turner would legislate in the area of consumer privacy.
55 Ryan, supra note 6 at 17. Eavesdropping was brought within cognizance of the courts by
Justices of the Peace Act 1361. In ReMacKenzie, 1945 CarswellOnt 63, [1945] O.R. 787,
[1946] 1D.L.R. 584, 85C.C.C. 233 (Ont.C.A.):King’sCounsel concluded that thepower
to administer preventive justice to deal with the nuisance of eavesdroppers is vested in
magistrates and Justices of the Peace in Ontario.
56 The Ryan Report review included criminal provisions regarding trespass and intimida-
tion, theBell TelephoneAct of 1880, the Statistics Act, theRadio Act, theTelegraphs Act,
and the Railway Act.
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inherent to granting protection to privacy that is ‘‘reasonable under all
the circumstances” may eat up the rule.57
Among the Report’s 20 recommendations were establishing controls over
private sector acquisition, use, and disclosure of personal information; personal
remedies; a system of consent; and controls over invasion of privacy related to
employment and other institutions whose legitimate activities establish a threat
to privacy. These recommendations were ultimately picked up by lawmakers in
Ontario. However, the Report’s chief requests, standalone privacy legislation
and the creation of a privacy tort, were ignored.58
American Influence
The consumer reporting industry in America had been operating with virtual
impunity and believed itself to be an outstanding protector of individual privacy.
To a congressional hearing in 1968, a reporting industry executive told members:
‘‘We have protected privacy for the past 60 years [. . .] and frankly, gentlemen, we
believe we can do it with computers.”59 However, privacy scholar Alan Westin’s
well-publicized testimony from 1966 remained a direct challenge to this
proposition. Westin illustrated the lax control over personal information for
the congressional subcommittee by obtaining, in one day, the ‘‘report of
character” of his female research assistant, detailing not only her financial
standing but information on her ‘‘character, habits, and morals.”60
In response to both the attention on the 1966 subcommittee on computers
and privacy and the growing influence of the consumer protection movement,
Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in October 1970.61 This
legislation became the model for both state and provincial action. Consumers
gained rights to notification in the case of employment and investigative report
requests, and were provided the credit bureau’s contact information when denied
credit, insurance, or employment benefits, or when their interest rates were
increased on the basis on an adverse report. Adverse items on reports were to be
deleted after seven years. Most importantly, consumers gained the right to
review, correct, and monitor the circulation of their personal information, but
without a right to inspect the report directly. Otherwise, consumer reports could
be furnished in response to a court order, for providing government benefits, for
employment or insurance purposes, or to a person with a ‘‘legitimate business
need” to use the information.
57 Ryan, supra note 6 at 73.
58 In 1968, British Columbia passed its Privacy Act, making it ‘‘a tort, actionable without
proof of damage, for a person wilfully and without a claim of right to violate the privacy
of another.” No substantial guidance was given as to the meaning or content of this
baldly stated cause of action.
59 Lauer, supra note 4 at 218.
60 Ibid at 219.
61 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC § 1681 (2016).
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Importantly, the FCRA created civil liability for non-compliance. As
Augusta Wilson writes, ‘‘the wall of silence and secrecy, the refusals because
‘we don’t think it feasible at this time,’ the ‘privilege’ to ruin a person’s career or
credit because of negligence” were destroyed by the FCRA.62 However, the
FCRA model was immediately criticized for two major deficiencies. First,
without direct inspection, the industry was allowed to revert to the secretive
methods of 19th century mercantile agencies, obfuscating what information they
did share with consumers when required by law.63 Second, the vague ‘‘legitimate
business need” stipulation was a catchall.64 Allowing information about business
transactions involving the consumer to flow to any persons who have a legitimate
need for that information meant the protections were limited by what was
normatively viewed as legitimate business operations.65 This framework
inherently favours the private sector over consumers because it is the industry-
defined business need that triggers the disclosure of a credit report, not the
individual’s consent.66
D. Ontario’s Consumer Reporting Act
Legislative History
While Ontario struggled to mobilize in response to the FCRA, its
counterparts in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia enacted legislation
based on the American model. After the Ryan Report, Professor Jacob Ziegel
lobbied for credit reporting reform in the province. Ziegel dismissed the business
community’s ‘‘Panglossian frame of mind” which critiqued consumer law as a
62 Augusta E Wilson, ‘‘The Future of Common-Law Libel Actions under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act” (1971) 21:1 Cath U L Rev 201 at 202 (‘‘Since the common-law
requirements for establishing malice are so stringent, and since 15 U.S.C. 168(1)(e)
prohibits actions for defamation unless the false information has been published with
malice, most consumers will probably proceed in the future under Section 168(1)(o),
which allows actual damages for negligent noncompliance,“ or under § 168(1)(n), which
permits both actual and punitive damages for willful noncompliance with the statute).
63 Lauer, supra note 4 at 226-227.
64 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, supra note 61, § 604.
65 In 1996, the ‘‘legitimate business needs” test abandoned the ‘‘involving the consumer”
formulation and replaced it with ‘‘initiated by the consumer” to clarify that there is no
permissible purpose for using a consumer report unless the consumer is already a
customer of the business. See US, Federal Trade Commission, Advisory Opinion,
‘‘Advisory Opinion to Tatelbaum” (26 July 2000), online: <www.ftc.gov/policy/
advisory-opinions/advisory-opinion-tatelbaum-07-26-00>. Further, a FTC Staff Opi-
nion notes that Congress intended the ‘‘permissible purposes” provisions of the Act to
cover, primarily, eligibility issues. See US, Federal Trade Commission, Advisory
Opinion, ‘‘Advisory Opinion to Buchman” (2 March 1998), online: <www.ftc.gov/
policy/advisory-opinions/advisory-opinion-buchman-03-02-98>.
66 See, e.g., US, Federal Trade Commission, Advisory Opinion, ‘‘Advisory Opinion to
Coffey” (11 February 1998), online:<www.ftc.gov/policy/advisory-opinions/advisory-
opinion-coffey-02-11-98>.
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leftist conspiracy. He instead relied on overwhelming proof of disparity in
bargaining power and the work of Henry Maine to emphasize the lack of
meaningful consensus ad idem in credit reports: modern society was reversing its
progress towards a society based on contract instead of status.67 Further, Ziegel
criticized the judiciary’s ‘‘painfully” slow pace at responding to the problems
posed by consumer reporting, noting that the ‘‘fiction of freely arrived at
bargains still haunts the judicial corridors.”68
A private members bill to protect privacy from invasion by the credit rating
industry was introduced on October 2, 1969, but did not receive debate.69 In
October 1972, then Minister of Financial and Consumer Affairs, Arthur
Wishart, introduced Bill 23, An Act to provide for the Control of Credit Reporting
Agencies, the Collection of Credit Information and Credit Reporting. Bill 23 was
poorly drafted, and Bill Davis’ Conservatives allowed it to lapse. In early 1971,
the new Minister, John Clement, introduced a rewritten bill, An Act to Control
the Storage and Supply of Personal Information for Rating Purposes. Unlike Bill
23 before it, this legislation would regulate not only credit reporting but the ‘‘all-
important field of personal information.”70 Bill 229 received a second reading
and was debated thoroughly, however, it fell subject to the legislative timetable.
In the next session, Clement reintroduced the legislation as Bill 101, which
subsequently received assent to on October 30, 1973 as the Consumer Reporting
Act.71
The Act requires all consumer reporting agencies to register with the
Registrar of Consumer Reporting Agencies and requires all persons seeking a
consumer report to notify applicants about their intention. Individuals are
granted the right to know whether or not a report has been obtained. If a benefit
was refused because of an adverse report, the recipient of the report must tell the
consumer. Consumers were also given the right to know what information an
agency had collected and from whom, the right to have the agency correct errors
drawn to its attention, and the right to see a copy of their reports. Yet, the
resulting legislation suffered from the same deficiencies as the FCRA. As a result
of the publicity of Alan Westin’s testimony before the congressional committee,
most Canadian legislation about consumer reporting included considerable detail
about the types of persons to whom a consumer report may be released.72
67 Ziegel ‘‘Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 34 at 491.
68 Ibid at 492.
69 Ontario, Legislative Assembly,Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 28th Parl, 1st Sess
(2 October 1969) at 6523 (Douglas Kennedy) (‘‘An Act to provide for the protection of
personal privacy prohibits violation of privacy including electronic eavesdropping and
the collection and use of economic commercial and social data without consent. It also
provides for the machinery for supervision and control.”).
70 Ontario,LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReport ofDebates (Hansard), 29thParl, 2ndSess
(6 December 1972) at 5194 (DM Deacon).
71 See Consumer Reporting Act, supra note 15.
72 See ibid s. 8.
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However, this detail boiled down to the same unprincipled ‘‘legitimate business
reason” test found in the FCRA.73
The source of these deficiencies can be explained by three all-too-familiar
themes which emerged during the debates over Bill 229 and Bill 101. First, the
legislature struggled to define the problem they were tasked with solving.
Similarly, facing pressure from industry but lacking an understanding of
computerization, lawmakers did not clearly conceptualize the degree of
transparency to be granted to the consumer. Finally, and most interestingly,
there was debate over whether legislating the qualified privilege historically
afforded to the industry was necessary at all.
Theme 1: Definitional Problems
A major flaw identified before Bill 229 was tabled was defining the scope of
the legislation. The debate in the Legislature was influenced by the 1968 report of
Dale Gibson and John Sharp that explained that there were two types of
reporting agencies causing concern: information exchanges between groups of
merchants, and information exchanges which actively search for information on
behalf of their members or customers.74 For descriptive and functional purposes,
a distinction was drawn between the two in Bill 229.75 In debate, however,
opposition member Donald Deacon suggested that the definition of ‘‘personal
reporting agency” was too narrow, applying only to those furnishing consumer
reports, and excluding purposes of investigation like insurance.76 Instead, Patrick
Lawlor called for separate legislation modeled on British Columbia’s Privacy
Act.77 Without clear definitions of exactly what activity was regulated and why,
the unchecked power of the industry could continue to grow.
Theme 2: Transparency Debate
Gibson and Sharp identified two serious risks to the privacy of individuals:
inaccurate or misleading information being reported, and accurate information
used for unjustifiable purposes.78 This problem troubled Ontario’s lawmakers
more than other jurisdictions as they debated whether to exclude uncorroborated
information from agency reports.79 Bill 229 included a provision excluding the
information unless its lack of corroboration was noted in the report. In Bill 101,
73 Fair Credit Reporting Act, supra note 61, s. 8(1)(d)(vi).
74 Gibson&Sharp, supra note 35 at 9. Their report, which focused on privacy implications,
also emphasized the risks posed by supplementing data collectedwith public records and
newspaper clippings.
75 Ziegel, ‘‘Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation,” supra note 43 at 507.
76 Ontario,LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReport ofDebates (Hansard), 29thParl, 2ndSess
(6 December 1972) at 5195 (DM Deacon).
77 Ontario,LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReport ofDebates (Hansard), 29thParl, 2ndSess
(6 December 1972) at 5198 (PD Lawlor).
78 Gibson & Sharp, supra note 45 at 13.
79 Ibid at 511. See also Sharp, supra note 46 at 130 where he raises this issue.
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only uncorroborated adverse information needed to be noted. Agencies could use
uncorroborated evidence so long as they adopted ‘‘reasonable procedures” to
ensure the accuracy of their records.
The right to transparency was strongly resisted by the industry because of the
potential exposure to libel action.80 Jacob Ziegel also criticized Bill 101’s
notification requirement for being too onerous in application, as it required
individuals who would never think they were subject to the legislation to notify
consumers. His examples included a professor rejecting a research assistant
because of a poor recommendation, a lawyer who interviews an articling student,
or a landlady who declines a room.81 This concern was picked up in legislative
debate in October 1973. Curiously, Bill 101 was the only legislation of the era to
include a provision that a credit grantor may not disclose to others information
about their transactions or experiences with the consumer without consent.
Ziegel questioned whether this 180-degree turn from industry norms would
actually be taken up. He opined: ‘‘is it really a meaningful step towards
protecting the consumer’s privacy in a domain where publicity and the free
dissemination of information has long been the rule?”82 Despite public criticism,
the Legislature ultimately deleted the clause protecting the disclosure of
information by one credit grantor to another, implicitly supporting industry.83
Theme 3: Legitimating Intrusion
Alan Westin’s 1966 testimony made its way directly into debate over Bill 229
when Lawlor raised the example of how easy it is to get an individual’s report.
Lawlor criticized the bill for intending to protect privacy but providing no
preventative mechanism. Echoing the Ryan Report, Jim Renwick argued at the
Standing Committee:
. . . the right to privacy that we are talking about is the need for a
citizen’s protection against the intrusion of his privacy regardless of
whether statement which are made are true or false. What we are
concerned about in our society is the need to protect people against the
true statement which is involved in terms of his own private life which is
just nobody’s business84
Renwick went on to express concern about the methods of observation used
by credit reporting agencies which to the ordinary citizen are ‘‘the least
ungentlemanly if not reprehensible.”
Further, Renwick challenged the very purpose of the legislation in debate on
both Bill 229 and Bill 101.85 Renwick suggested the financial industry’s need for
80 Ziegel, ‘‘Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation,” supra note 43 at 506.
81 Ibid at 509.
82 Ibid at 510.
83 ‘‘Another defeat for the right to privacy,” The Globe and Mail (5 October 1973) 6.
84 Ontario,LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReport ofDebates (Hansard), 29thParl, 2ndSess
(6 December 1972) at 5205 (JA Renwick).
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consumer information was overstated: ‘‘it seems to me what we are doing here is
institutionalizing a credit reporting industry which had its origin in the assumed
need of financial institutions in the province to get information about individual
citizens”86 Raising Warren and Brandeis’s famous 1891 essay on the right to
privacy Renwick explained that the right is not just to prevent inaccurate
portrayal of private life, but to prevent its being depicted at all:
. . . we cannot support this bill which appears to legitimize the right of
credit reporting agencies to collect personal information, meaning
information about a consumer’s character, reputation, health, physical
or personal character or mode of living.87
Interestingly, Bill 229 did not extend qualified privilege to the agency when
obliged to open its files, opening the agency to civil litigation. Clement intended
to allow the common law of defamation to protect credit reporting, arguably
defeating the purpose of intervening in the industry at all. Ziegel criticized the
legislature for this oversight and noted that the Manitoba Act provided the
immunity expressly.88 Lawlor pointed out the Legislature ought to understand
the difference in American law on qualified privilege and Canadian law. In the
United States, absent gross negligence, nuisance or trespass, credit agencies were
able to disseminate information broadly. In Canada, qualified privilege only
related to the internal dissemination of the information — leaks were subject to
damages and to injunctions with the onus on the information collector to prove
they were not negligent.89 Yet, this difference was not entrenched in the Bill in
any way. Ultimately, Renwick concluded that the ‘‘Bill is not a step forward
because of the scope of the information collected.” The lack of express qualified
privilege indicated a lack of purpose to the legislation which opened up a
significant gap in Ontario’s data protection law. What is the public interest in a
consumer protection statute that only implicitly affirms the common law and
industry norms?
85 Ibid at 4844.
86 Ibid at 5198.
87 Ibid at 5207.
88 See Ziegel, ‘‘Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation,” supra note 43 at 513 (‘‘If a
reporting agency is obliged to open its files to the consumer fairness would seem to
suggest that it should also be protected against libel suits, at least in those cases where the
agency has exercised reasonable care in the collection and dissemination of the
information on its files and has acted without malice.”). In the Manitoba legislation, an
express privilege was provided at s. 16: “No user, personal reporter or personal reporting
agency is civilly liable to the subject of a personal report or personal file, unless the user,
reporter or agency, as the case may be is or ought to be reasonably aware that part or all
of the information in the report or personal file is false, or misleading, or was obtained
negligently.”
89 Ontario,LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReport ofDebates (Hansard), 29thParl, 2ndSess
(6 December 1972) at 5199 (JA Renwick).
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II. CONSUMER LAW’S CONTEMPORARY ROLE
A. Resulting Gap in Consumer Law in Ontario
Existing Enforcement Problems
A 1975 Globe and Mail article reported that when Bill 101 was passed, the
Credit Bureau of Greater Toronto hired extra staff for an expected rush.
However, Ontario consumers did not respond, likely because the vast majority of
consumers did not hit roadblocks related to their credit.90 The decline in interest
in consumer protection law did not help.91 Despite known flaws in the
legislation, the Act was not updated until 1988 when amendments requiring
agencies to inform consumers about third party requests for information were
added in an attempt to stop businesses from using consumer reports to target
consumer marketing.92
As expected by Bill 101’s detractors, the Ontario courts upheld the common
law qualified privilege protecting consumer reports. In Haskett v. Trans Union of
Canada Inc., the leading case on consumer reporting in Ontario, the Court of
Appeal held that a claim for negligence is available for incorrect reporting of
information.93 In a 2009 study of the Act, Kent Glowinski criticized the low
threshold agencies must meet in addressing consumer complaints.94 For instance,
Anderson v. Excel Collection Services Ltd. confirmed that only false information
‘‘knowingly” supplied will fall under the Act’s offence provision.95 This means
that consumers who are unhappy with the practices of an agency or an entry on
their report are limited to filing a complaint with the Registrar.96
Glowinski notes that while litigation challenging the accuracy of information
on credit reports is a relatively new phenomenon, there is a significant access to
justice issue limiting this evolution of consumer protection law.97 Not all
90 Elizabeth Patton explains how those who do complain about privacy, or are overtly
concerned with their privacy, are often cast as ‘‘paranoid,” yet this paranoia is required
by privacy law jurisprudence in the assessment of whether a subjective reasonable
expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable. See ‘‘Privacy and the Reasonable
Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places” 50:3 UTLJ 305.
91 See Jacob Ziegel, ‘‘Is Canadian Consumer Law Dead” (1995) 24:3 Can Bus LJ 417
(Ziegel blamed the decline in interest in consumer law on the Reagan Administration’s
apathy for consumer protection).
92 Dawn King, ‘‘Ontario requires credit bureaus to tell consumers about reports,” The
Globe and Mail (27 June 1988) A13.
93 Haskett v. Trans Union of Canada Inc., 2003 CarswellOnt 692, 224 D.L.R. (4th) 419, 63
O.R. (3d) 577, [2003] O.J. No. 771 (Ont. C.A.).
94 Kent Glowinski, ‘‘Don’t Get Enough Credit? The Need for an Impartial Consumer
Credit Report Appeal Tribunal in Ontario” (2009) 22 J L & Soc Pol’y 5 at 6.
95 2005 CarswellOnt 4829, 260 D.L.R. (4th) 367, [2005] O.J. No. 4195, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d)
391 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
96 The Act provides a right to appeal from the Registrar. But, as Glowinski notes, since
2000, not one appeal regarding incorrect information on a credit report has been brought
before the Licence Appeal Tribunal.
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individual consumers have the expertise, nor can they afford litigation against a
corporation like Equifax. Further, litigation over negative information on a
credit report requires the entire judicial process of a civil defamation action,
which backlogs Ontario’s courts.98 These limitations suggest that more direct
government intervention through a statutory regime is required to protect
citizens in this area.
Emerging Enforcement Problems
The nature of credit reporting has also changed. When the Consumer
Reporting Act was enacted, there were nearly 200 credit reporting agencies in
Canada; today, there are two.99 Contemporary ‘‘credit reporting agencies” look
very different because in our data-rich world, the credit bureau’s access to
consumer account information and past payment behaviour is no longer unique.
In the age of big data, the distinction between credit and noncredit data has lost
its meaning.100 Reputations can be inferred from other variables not directly
connected to credit history, such as social media activity, or even one’s use of
capitalization in an online application.101 Equifax and TransUnion are now just
two of many data brokers that peddle names, addresses, and behavioural
insights.102 Contrary to a purposive approach to the Consumer Reporting Act,
Ontario has not enforced licensing requirements on new entrants to this
industry.103
For example, the growing digital tenant and employee screening sector is
currently unregulated. Two Canadian start-ups, Certn and Naborly, exemplify
why this lack of enforcement may be concerning. Both Certn and Naborly offer a
platform which allows landlords to create custom tenant applications that collect
97 Glowinski, supra note 94 at 10.
98 Ibid at 14.
99 Ziegel, ‘‘Canadian Consumer Reporting Legislation,” supra note 43; Glowinski, supra
note 94 at 6. There are also credit-monitoring services like Credit Karma which, in
exchange for the very same information consumers try to protect, will show a credit
score.
100 Lauer, supra note 4 at 266.
101 Ibid at 267.
102 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) defines data brokers as ‘‘companies that
collect personal information about consumers form a variety of public and non-public
sources and resell the information to other companies.” See Research Group of the
Office of the PrivacyCommissioner of Canada, ‘‘Data Brokers: ALook at the Canadian
and American Landscape” (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
2014).
103 SeeReRizzo&RizzoShoesLtd., [1998] 1998CarswellOnt 1, 1998CarswellOnt 2, [1998] 1
S.C.R. 27, 154D.L.R. (4th) 193 (sub nom.Adrien v. OntarioMinistry of Labour), [1998]
S.C.J.No. 2 (S.C.C.). (‘‘Today there is only oneprinciple or approach, namely, thewords
of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary
sense harmoniouslywith the scheme of theAct, the object of theAct, and the intention of
Parliament.”).
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pertinent information from tenants.104 The platforms create a comprehensive
dossier, in some cases using ‘‘over 500 data points,” on the potential tenant
including social media, credit, rents histories, and even a basic Google search on
the tenant, to provide a prediction to the landlord on whether or not the tenant is
suitable for a lease.105 Public knowledge of the functioning of the ‘‘artificial
intelligence” algorithms used by these startups is limited to their marketing
statements.106
Since Naborly, which is based in Ontario, does not report to a credit
reporting agency, it does not need to register as a ‘‘personal information
investigator” as defined in the Act.107 However, a purposive interpretation of s. 2
of the Act would include Naborly as a ‘‘consumer reporting agency,” considering
the purpose of their data use is to provide data to a person who they know
intends to use the information in connection with the entering into or renewal of
a tenancy agreement.108 Instead, the digital tenancy screening sector is not
currently subject to provincial oversight because its terms of use contract out of
the Act, and potentially the Ontario Human Rights Code,109 using a privacy
policy that puts the burden of its investigatory role on its customers and
prospective tenants.110
Naborly and Certn’s reach into social behavioural data is comparable to the
system of social scoring contemplated by the Chinese Government, which has
received widespread criticism.111 Wired reports the State Council’s goal is to, by
104 See Naborly, online: <www.naborly.com>; Certn, online: <certn.co/tenancy/>.
105 John Biggs, ‘‘Naborly lets landlords screen tenants automatically,” TechCrunch (15
August 2016), online: <techcrunch.com/2016/08/15/naborly-lets-landlords-screen-te-
nants-automagically/>. See Naborly, “Privacy Policy” (June 29, 2018), online:
<naborly.com/privacy>.
106 For example, Naborly explains: ‘‘Our Applied Artificial Intelligence system learns from
and leverages the experience gained from screening thousands of rental applicants and
their tenancy outcomes. This helpsNaborly’s analysts and customers see patterns of risk
that could only can be detected by our AI.” See also Certn, ‘‘FAQ Softcheck Pre-
Screening,” online: <certn.co/softcheck/>.
107 See Consumer Reporting Act, supra note 15.
108 Section 2 of the Act defines ‘‘consumer reporting agency” as a person who, for gain or
profit or on a regular co-operative non-profit basis, furnishes consumer reports. Ibid, s. 2.
109 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19.
110 See Naborly, supra note 105: ‘‘We may collect information from various sources,
including credit reporting agencies, collection agencies, government entities and legal
suppliers. We also collect information from you directly. We collect information when
you sign up for aNaborly account, when you provide information as part of our identity
verification process, or when you fill out a formor enter information on theWebsite.We
also collect information when you upload information to the Service, participate in
promotions offered by Naborly or our partners, respond to our surveys, or otherwise
communicate with us.”.
111 See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, ‘‘Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its
citizens,” Wired UK (21 October 2017), online: <www.wired.co.uk/article/chinese-
government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion>.
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2020, trail all citizens with a file of public and private data, searchable by
biometrics, covering all of society. The system is enabled by Alipay, a third-party
mobile and online payment platform that collects financial, social media, and
location data to assess a credit score and uses big data to apply a ‘‘social
score.”112 Like early 20th century consumer surveillance, Alipay’s social credit
system and tenant screening algorithms are designed to ‘‘ensure that the bad
people in society don’t have a place to go, while good people can move freely and
without obstruction.”113
Predictive algorithms, like Naborly’s and Certn’s, mine personal information
to make guesses about individuals’ likely actions and risks.114 Because humans
program these predictive algorithms, their biases and values are embedded
within.115 As the OECD explains, ‘‘the misuse of these insights can affects core
values and principles such as individual autonomy, equality and free speech, and
may have a broader impact on society as a whole.”116 Despite claiming
efficiencies for consumers in the short-term, the emphasis on sorting is
detrimental to consumers. The discrimination enabled by data analytics limits
an individual’s ability to escape the impact of pre-existing socio-economic
indicators.117 Citizens end up with fewer choice of goods or service, higher prices,
and poorer quality, thereby increasing wealth inequality.118 The result is that
‘‘firms can not only take advantage of a general understanding of cognitive
limitations, but can uncover, and even trigger, consumer frailty at an individual
level.”119 Without regulation, negative inferences made by platforms like
Naborly and Certn will drive landlord action because correlation is deemed
sufficient.120 However, even accurate information is capable of causing harm if
112 MaraHvistendahl, ‘‘InsideChina’sVastNewExperiment in SocialRanking,”Wired (14
December 2017), online:<www.wired.com/story/age-of-social-credit/>. Interestingly,
in contrast to North America, China’s massive economy developed to the present
without much of a credit system.
113 Ibid. Worse than in the 1930’s though, the way the Chinese social credit system is
designed, being blacklisted by a retailer sends you on a rapid downward spiral: ‘‘First
your score drops. Then your friends hear you are on the blacklist and, fearful that their
scores might be affected, quietly drop you as a contact. The algorithm notices, and your
score plummets further.”
114 Keats Citron & Pasquale, supra note 12 at 3.
115 Ibid.
116 OECD, Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report
(Paris: OECD, 2014).
117 Ibid.
118 Maurice Stucke & Allen Grünes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016) at 53.
119 Frank Pasquale, ‘‘Algorithms: How Companies’ Decisions About Data and Content
Impact Consumers” (Written testimony before the United States House of Representa-
tives Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and
Consumer Protection, 29 November 2017) citing Ryan Calo, ‘‘Digital Market
Manipulation,” (2014) 82:4 Geo Wash L Rev 995.
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used in such an unreasonable manner. As Gibson and Sharp wrote in 1968,
‘‘truth is a dangerous commodity.”121
B. Privacy Law’s Private Law Limit
Limits of Consent-based Legislation
The failure to enforce provincial consumer protection law cannot be cured by
existing private-sector privacy regulations. While all private companies in
Canada that collect, use, or disclose personal information in the course of
commercial activity, including consumer reporting agencies, are subject to the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),122 the
Act is insufficient to protect the right to be left alone contemplated by the
consumer law movement. PIPEDA is based on the OECD Privacy Guidelines,
which require that individuals must provide valid and informed consent before
the collection, use, or disclosure of personal data. This model of consent,
however, relies on users deciding for themselves how to weigh the costs and
benefits of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information. Despite
emphasizing the rights to transparency, to notice, to prevent personal data from
being used for new purposes, and to correct or amend one’s record, this scheme
has been widely criticized because it relies on a mythical ‘‘informed and rational
person” who makes appropriate decisions.123 Further, consent today cannot
reasonably be considered informed consent to a vague but accurate description
of a use in the distant future, especially if that use is subject to change with
context. As Zeigel knew in 1961, consensus ad idem is non-existent in the trade of
consumer information.
Further, like in the Consumer Reporting Act, the notion of a tradeoff between
privacy and legitimate business interests is fundamental to PIPEDA.124 Yet,
evidence suggests that rather than trading off privacy for free cheap goods and
services, many ‘‘feel resigned to the inevitability of surveillance and the power of
marketers to harvest their data.”125 Also, the regulatory scheme presented by
PIPEDA does not include an enforcement mechanism for unreasonable reuse of
personal information. Instead, it allows user-generated content to become the
120 Ibid at 8.
121 Gibson & Sharp, supra note 35.
122 S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA].
123 Daniel Solove, ‘‘Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma”
(2013) 126 Harv L Rev at 1880. Frank Pasquale describes this model as a ‘‘naı̈vely
economistic approach to privacy as a normal goodor service to be bargained for, like any
other,” Frank Pasquale, supra note 119 at 19.
124 See PIPEDA, supra note 122, s. 3.
125 See University of Pittsburgh Annenberg School for Communication, ‘‘The Tradeoff
Fallacy: HowMarketers areMisrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them
Up to Exploitation,” by Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper (2015).
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private property of the platform which collects it, normalizing apathy amongst
users.
Limits of Protecting Privacy and Reputation Together
The purpose of PIPEDA is to protect the privacy of individuals, in a manner
that is tempered against the needs of organizations to collect, use, or disclose
personal information for legitimate purposes, particularly focused on supporting
and promoting electronic commerce.126 Far too often, however, this purpose is
conflated with the protection of reputation. Privacy, as a right of control, is very
different from reputation. One fundamental difference lies in the fact that
revelation of the truth in reputation cases should not be considered defamatory,
while the revelation of the truth in privacy cases can often be harmful for the
victim. In addition, reputation protections (primarily the tort of defamation) are
seen to chill free speech, while privacy protections (either statutory or in tort)
defend autonomy and are thus seen to encourage expression.127 Reputation and
privacy may be different aspects of an individual’s persona, both shaping their
participation in democracy, but the law has drawn a sharp distinction between
the two. Privacy should not be conflated with reputation, as the harm emanating
from one does not constitute the harm emanating from the other.
The S.C.C.’s recent handling of reputation in Charter jurisprudence perhaps
extends this confusion. In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, the Court
held that defamation constitutes an invasion of privacy, worthy of protection
and careful balancing against freedom of expression.128 This seemingly departs
from the previous jurisprudence regarding the absoluteness of freedom of
expression. Further, in A.B. v. Bragg Communications, the S.C.C. continued to
blur the distinction between reputation and privacy by treating these separate
aspects of an individual’s persona together.129 In this case, a teenager sought to
unmask her cyberbullies in order to pursue a defamation action, while preserving
her own anonymity. The Court balanced the open courts principle with the
plaintiff’s privacy interests, allowing the anonymous plaintiff to realize the
benefits of a defamation action. Ultimately, laws protecting reputation are
unhelpful for consumer protection because they rely heavily on one tool:
correcting falsehoods. Therefore, defamation is limited to correcting for malice.
Further, free speech is frequently invoked to protect the business model of
the attention economy. The insights mined out of user behaviour become the
126 See especially David Fraser, ‘‘You’d better forget the right to be forgotten in Canada,”
Canadian Privacy Law Blog (28 April 2016), online: <blog.privacylawyer.ca/2016/04/
youd-better-forget-right-to-be.html>.
127 Antoon Da Baets, Responsible History (New York: Berghahn, 2008) at 131.
128 Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 1995 CarswellOnt 396, 1995 CarswellOnt 534,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129 (S.C.C.) at para 121.
129 David Ralph, ‘‘Anonymity and Defamation” in G Martin, R Scott Bray & M Kumar,
eds, Secrecy, Law and Society (London: Routledge, 2015) at 211; A.B. (Litigation
Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, 2012 SCC 46.
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speech of the platform to be strongly defended against regulatory intervention.
Defamation law’s core balancing act between the public interest in expression
and the protection of reputation affirms the power of platforms. Importantly,
this ‘‘free speech opportunism” is rooted in a neoliberal tradition older than
Google or Facebook’s founders: the myth of consumer choice.130 Without the
option to not participate, consumer choice cannot truly exist.
Just as consumer surveillance was defended in the 19th and 20th centuries by
the choice it provided to consumers and by the idea that the free flow of credit
into the economy was essential to society, platform capitalism is protected by the
myth of Internet exceptionalism. In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, regulators
were weary of imposing burdens on Internet intermediaries because they wanted
to preserve the ‘‘utopian” ideals presented by the Internet.131 Early liability
schemes accepted the importance of an ‘‘unfettered” Internet. This myth, that the
Internet is unique and should be afforded its own regulatory framework outside
traditional legal norms, pervades Canadian copyright, telecommunication, and
even defamation law.132 However, policies which grant sweeping immunity to
Internet platforms impact the rule of law because they fail to address how
technological innovation will not necessarily enhance freedoms. For example, as
Dutton notes, the protection and proliferation of freedom of expression is not a
technologically determined outcome or an inherent consequence of Internet
use.133 Further, contrary to popular belief, provinces are able to exert control
over Internet platforms and data brokers because these intermediaries are readily
localizable.134 Intermediaries are not just global actors, but also local businesses
130 See Pasquale, ‘‘Reputation,” supra note 8 at 524 (Pasquale describes this opportunism as
‘‘Google’s core defence.”).
131 See especially Pippa Norris, Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and
the Internet Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The prime
example of this policy position is the enactment of 47 USC § 230, an amendment to the
United StatesCommunication Decency Act (‘‘CDA”) which immunized online providers
from liability for publishing most types of third party content.
132 TimWu, ‘‘Is Internet ExceptionalismDead?” in Berin Szoka &AdamMarcus, eds, The
Next Digital Decade—Essays on the Future of the Internet (Washington, DC: Tech
Freedom, 2010) 179 at 180. See especially Society of Composers, Authors & Music
Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, 2004
CarswellNat 1919, 2004 CarswellNat 1920, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, (sub nom. SOCAN v.
CanadianAssn. of Internet Providers), [2004] S.C.J. No. 44 (S.C.C.). See also Crookes v.
Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2011 SCC 47, 2011 CarswellBC 2627, 2011 CarswellBC
2628, (sub nom.Crookes v.Newton), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269, [2011] S.C.J.No. 47 (S.C.C.), in
which the S.C.C. assessed the balance between the core significance of hyperlinks to the
Internet and principles of defamation, concluding ‘‘strict application of the publication
rule in these circumstances would be like trying to fit a square archaic peg into the
hexagonal hole of modernity.”
133 William Dutton, et al, Freedom of Connection—Freedom of Expression: The Changing
Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet (Paris: UNESCO, 2011) at 6.
134 Janni Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016) at 7.
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acting through physical infrastructure.135 Regardless, these challenges within
privacy and Internet law indicate the need for help from other areas of law.
III. LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER LAW
A. Role for Consumer Law in 21st Century Canada
In 1968, Zeigel asked:
. . . would it not be better to abandon the fiction of contract altogether
and to recognize that the state may have to regulate all the significant
terms of consumer credit transactions, just as it has been compelled to
do in the case of several types of insurance contracts?136
The 2017 ruling in Douez v. Facebook echoes this question. In Douez, the
court was faced with determining the correct forum for a dispute over the alleged
invasion of a Canadian user’s privacy by Facebook. The social media platform’s
contract of adhesion purported to displace the British Columbia Privacy Act,
forcing the user to bring suit in California, a jurisdiction decidedly less
sympathetic to those who exchange their personal information to access the
conveniences of a free online service.137 Writing for the majority, Justice Abella
found in favour of the Canadian user, emphasizing the ‘‘quasi-constitutional”
nature of privacy legislation and, most importantly, the power imbalance
between the monolithic platform and the individual. Justice Abella’s decision,
like Ziegel before her, questions the existence of ‘‘meaningful alternatives” in a
society structured around platform capitalism.138
Marina Pavolvic explains how this power imbalance is worsened under
platform capitalism, which is dominated by a few monopolistic market players.
While consumers still play the role of passive actors in the market economy,
‘‘virtually all aspects of our daily lives and social interactions are made possible
by, and conditioned on, being consumers first.”139 Often, in order to access
goods and services on a platform the user must first agree to a lengthy standard-
from contract:
135 For a more detailed account of the materiality of the Internet, see Andrew Blum, Tubes:
A Journey to the Center of the Internet (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2012).
136 Ziegel, ‘‘Consumer Credit Regulation,” supra note 34 at 491.
137 The S.C.C. continues to deny the existence of the doctrine of third party consent in
Canada. See R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, 2017 CarswellOnt 19341, 2017 CarswellOnt
19342, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59 (S.C.C.) at para 40;R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC
53, 2012 CarswellOnt 12684, 2012 CarswellOnt 12685, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, [2012] S.C.J.
No. 53 (S.C.C.) at para 74.
138 Douez, supra note 1.
139 MarinaPavolvic, ‘‘Consumer rights in a radically differentmarketplace,”PolicyOptions
(4 June 2018), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/june-2018/consumer-rights-
radically-different-marketplace/>.
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When they read digital books, stream documentaries or submit
assignments through learning management systems, students are being
consumers first. When we use our phones, the Internet, messaging apps
or social media to communicate with friends and family, we are all
being consumers first. The list of interactions that are premised on
being consumers first goes on and on.140
And yet, Canadian provinces have largely failed to enforce their legislative
schemes regulating consumer surveillance, which themselves only address
technical errors or omissions on credit reports. To date, there is still no
binding legislative or administrative tool for a consumer to challenge or dispute
incorrect information on a credit report.
After Douez, the potential for a province to regulate the interaction between
platforms that collect data and consumers is clearer. As Keats Citron and
Pasquale note, we have made commitments to protect consumers from serious
harms that they have no means to prevent and thus ‘‘providing oversight to the
scoring systems that can cause negative spirals should be a critical aim of our
legal system.”141 If the fundamental problem posed by modern data brokers is
that we lack viable alternatives, the law may be required to create those
alternatives. However, to effectively learn from the first attempt at regulating
consumer surveillance in the 1970s, the legislatures ought to recognize the
specific role of data collection in platform capitalism: to support business.
Correcting for this power imbalance will require returning to the three questions
that plagued the legislature during debate over the Consumer Reporting Act: why
is consumer protection necessary; who is the consumer; and why legitimize
industry norms through legislation.
B. Potential Solutions
Limited Solution: No-Go Zones and Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner suggested returning to the idea of
‘‘No-Go Zones” for data collection, use, and disclosure. This proposal seeks to
separate legitimate information management practices from areas organizations
should not venture into.142 While this call from the OPC is commendable for
emphasizing fair, transparent, and accountable data analysis which avoids false
positive or false negative results, it is a limited solution. The history of credit
reporting regulation proves that ‘‘legitimate business interests” is a low
threshold, incapable of addressing the overwhelming power imbalance between
platforms and users. Further, this idea is already captured in s. 9(3) of the
140 Ibid.
141 Keats Citron & Pasquale, supra note 12.
142 SeeOffice of the PrivacyCommissioner ofCanada, ‘‘Draft guidance: Inappropriate data
practices — interpretation and application of subsection 5(3)” (Ottawa: OPC, 2017),
online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-
on-consent-under-pipeda/gd_53_201709/>.
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Consumer Reporting Act, which lists what type of data cannot be included in a
consumer report. Instead, a solution must center the citizen’s ability to not
participate, no matter how reasonable and bona fide the business interest.143
Without more, this solution will repeat the mistake of simply entrenching the
status quo.
Another limited solution is a turn to tort law, which was called for in the
original debates over the Consumer Protection Act. The American tort of
intrusion upon seclusion was adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in 2012 in
Jones v Tsige.144 To make out the tort, the defendant’s conduct must be
intentional, must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff’s
private affairs, and must be regarded by a reasonable person as highly offensive
causing distress, humiliation, or anguish.145 It provides a monetary remedy and
is therefore a disincentive, but it does not address the norms afforded by
technological change which encourage a loss of privacy because, like defamation,
intrusion upon seclusion too relies on malice. While an important tool in certain
circumstances, it is a line drawing exercise with little usefulness in achieving the
goal of consumer protection of correcting for power imbalances.
In the court’s decision in Jones, Justice Sharpe implied that it is morally
problematic that information can now be improperly accessed with ease, but
penalized only the age-old human interest in the information of others. This
underscores a lack of understanding of the process of information design. The
design of digital platforms, like a bank’s account databases, is not arbitrary.
Distinct choices are made in the design of each system, in response to contextual
needs. What is unaddressed by the structure of the Jones test is that the injury
caused by a nosey viewer is also a consequence of the cost-benefit analyses
performed by a corporation while designing their business. Thus, the tort as
currently formulated arguably creates a remedy without a right because it does
not assess or deter systems which normalize this type of impropriety.146
Corporations simply have to avoid malice, but the individual citizen is not
granted any right to better data protection. By obscuring the role of systems
design, Jones does not help with the problem at hand: reinforcing why consumer
protection, which includes the right to be left alone or to choose which economic
systems to participate in, is important to a free and democratic society.
143 Relatedly, there should be protection of partial participation as a type of participation.
144 Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274, 108 O.R. (3d) 241, 346 D.L.R.
(4th) 34, [2012] O.J. No. 148 (Ont. C.A.).
145 Ibid at para 71.
146 Douez, supra note 1 at para 59. (‘‘In this context, it is especially important that such
harms do not go without remedy. And since Ms. Douez’s matter requires an
interpretation of a statutory privacy tort, only a local court’s interpretation of privacy
rights under the Privacy Act will provide clarity and certainty about the scope of the
rights to others in the province.”)
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Promising Suggestion: Enforcing ‘‘Data Cut-Off” Laws
In 1970, Professor Sharp suggested that ‘‘cut-off” dates should be applied to
certain adverse facts collected by consumer reporting agencies after the lapse of
given periods of time.147 This idea, borrowed from bankruptcy law, was added to
the Consumer Reporting Act because lawmakers recognized the contextual nature
of information. However, modern Canadian proposals to enforce the deletion of
information by Internet intermediaries are widely criticized and quickly
dismissed.148 At their best, these arguments recognize the fundamental
importance of freedom of expression in society and the potential for abuse.149
At their worst, a Canadian court decision requiring an American corporation to
help with the administration of justice by not sharing a patent-infringing product
description, using technology that the corporation uses every day to change the
global distribution of information, was recast as a validation of potential human
rights violations in foreign totalitarian states.150
These dismissals of broad, unspecific approaches to data processing should
not discourage Canadian lawmakers. Enforcing the concept of data ‘‘cut-off
dates” already provided for in the Consumer Reporting Act could also have an
anti-trust element.151 By devaluing stores of potentially irrelevant information,
platforms may be less inclined to merge and hoard datasets. Accurate data on
consumer preferences could then be privileged over inferences from unwieldy
datasets. ‘‘Cut-off dates” are not a ‘‘right to be forgotten.” As Ignacio Cofone
explains, the decision in Google v. Spain, which ushered in global conversations
about the permanency of digital memory, is not about limiting speech, but rather
the liability of search engines under the rights and obligations established in the
European Data Protection Directive.152 In the decision, the European Court of
Justice dictates that the processing of data that is no longer relevant violates the
147 Sharp, supra note 46.
148 See, e.g.,MichaelGeist, ‘‘Right to be forgotten’ ruling lacks balance:Geist”TorontoStar
(16 May 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/business/tech_news/2014/05/16/right_to_-
be_forgotten_ruling_lacks_balance_geist.html>.
149 See, e.g., Nicholas Watt & Mark Sweeney, ‘‘Sajid Javid: Terrorists and criminals are
exploiting ‘right to be forgotten,’” The Guardian (11 November 2014), online: <https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/11/sajid-javid-terrorists-criminals-right-
to-be-forgotten>.
150 See Google v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 34, 2017 CarswellBC 1727, 2017
CarswellBC 1728, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 410 D.L.R. (4th) 625 (S.C.C.); Jason Proctor,
‘‘Google appeal of worldwide injunction headed to Supreme Court,” CBC News (18
February 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/google-appeal-
of-worldwide-injunction-headed-to-supreme-court-1.3453653> (‘‘the worldwide in-
junction could lead to lowest-common denominator law, where technology companies
like Google are forced to respond to restrictive judgments from courts in countries like
Saudi Arabia”).
151 See Stucke & Grünes, supra note 118.
152 Ignacio Cofone, ‘‘Google v Spain: A right to be forgotten?” (2015) 15:1 Chicago-Kent J
Int’l & Comp L 1.
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terms of the directive, and extends the right to erasure and the right to objection
to include search engines as a consequence of considering them. In this light,
Google v. Spain simply supports the enforcement of data processing law. Whether
data hoarding is the consumer problem we need to solve should be studied in the
Canadian context.
Promising Suggestion: Enforcing a Right to Explanation
In 1966, Yale Law Profess Charles Reich testified that the obfuscation of
data processing was a ‘‘denial of the constitutional right to confront, the
constitutional right to face those who make statements about you, to question
them, and to rebut and answer.”153 While a modern approach to data ‘‘cut-off
dates” will help challenge the monopoly of data-rich platforms, a ‘‘right to
explanation” influenced by the original debate over the Consumer Reporting Act
goes one step further.
Keats Citron and Pasquale suggest that protection for citizens could result
from ‘‘technological due process,” where predictive algorithms would be required
to live up to standards of review and revision to ensure fairness and accuracy.154
This approach, however, is plagued by the same problem of self-regulation if
‘‘fairness” and ‘‘accuracy” are defined by the data owner, and not the data
producer. An exemplary ‘‘right to explanation” can be found in Europe’s new
General Data Protection Regulation.155 Certain provisions of articles 13-15
require data controllers to provide data subjects with information about the
existence of automated decision making, including profiling, meaningful
information about the logic involved and the significance for the subject
through notification and an access to information right. Article 22 of the
directive provides that data subjects ‘‘have the right not to be subject to a
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, as well as
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly
affects him or her.”
As Selbst and Powles argue, these rights support fundamental aspects of
autonomy and personhood because they require explanations that are
meaningful to the subject, a person presumably without technical expertise.156
An example of this right in practice is legislation requiring a platform to explain
an automated decision well enough for the data subject to determine whether
they have an actionable discrimination claim.157 This could be accomplished at
153 US, The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 89th Cong, 2nd sess
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1966) at 28.
154 Keats Citron & Pasquale, supra note 12 at 8.
155 Andrew D Selbst & Julia Powles, ‘‘Meaningful Information and the Right to
Explanation” (2017) 7:4 International Data Privacy Law 233.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid at 8. (‘‘This interpretation is supported by Article 5’s requirement that data
processing be lawful, fair, and transparent to the data subject, as well as Article 12’s
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the licensing phase required by the Consumer Reporting Act. A plain-language
description of how a consumer reporting agency’s data processing practices
accord with the Human Rights Code as a precondition to obtaining a license to
operate in a province would be a welcome start.
Model Solution: Vermont’s Return to Meaningful Oversight
The most promising response may be the simplest: a return to an active state
enforcement of basic regulatory tactics. In response to recent data breaches, the
state of Vermont passed Bill H.764, An act relating to data brokers and consumer
protection, in an attempt to impose accountability on companies that collect and
sell information about Vermont residents. Under the new legislation, data
brokers are defined as businesses ‘‘aggregating and selling data about consumers
with whom the business does not have a direct relationship” and which ‘‘provide
information that is critical to services offered in the modern economy, including:
targeted marketing and sales; credit reporting; background checks; government
information; risk mitigation and fraud detection; people search; decisions by
banks, insurers, or others whether to provide services; ancestry research; and
voter targeting and strategy by political campaigns.”158 Data brokers are
required to pay a $100 annual fee to register with the state and must educate
Vermont residents on the data they collect, and how to withdraw their consent to
collection. Further, Vermont removed fees previously associated with freezing
credit reports collected by credit reporting bureaus.159 This legislation is
promising primarily because it is not innovative. It applies tested statutory
tools at the local level in an attempt to correct the imbalance of power favouring
industry. It takes on the challenge of redefining the problem of consumer
protection for the twenty-first century, clarifies who it seeks to protect, and
explains why it is legislating in this space.160 This project of redefining consumer
rights in legislation to reflect the ‘‘new complexities” of consumer-business
relationships is essential to protecting human rights.161
CONCLUSIONS
Consumer protection legislation across the country has not responded
adequately to ‘‘the realities of today’s marketplace.”162 This is not because the
emphasis on intelligibility and requirement that ‘[t]he controller shall facilitate the
exercise of data subject rights.’”).
158 US, H.764, An act relating to data brokers and consumer protection, 2017-18, Reg sess,
Vt, 2018 (enacted).
159 AJ Dellinger, ‘‘Vermont Passes First-of-Its-Kind Law to Regulate Data Brokers,”
Gizmodo (27 May 2018), online: <gizmodo.com/vermont-passes-first-of-its-kind-law-
to-regulate-data-b-1826359383>.
160 The main impetus behind Bill H.764 is cyber security.
161 Pavolvic, supra note 139.
162 Ibid.
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enactors of those statutes were incapable of contemplating platform capitalism,
but rather because there is not yet public consensus on what meaningful choice
over personal information means in the contemporary commercial spaces of our
free and democratic society. The history of consumer surveillance in Ontario also
illustrates that citizens have never been made fully aware of how the information
collected about them is used. However, this does not mean citizens accept the
trade-off presented to them. Where there are no meaningful alternatives to
participation in platform capitalism, a legal response will not do well to only
protect citizens where corporations are objectively operating in bad faith.
Canada’s private-sector privacy regulation has failed to meet this challenge —
reducing the distance between citizen and data holder — because it is based on a
model of consent which cannot easily conceptualize activities beyond the direct
relationship between user and data collector.163 As Lisa Austin argues, if we care
about control over our own beliefs, prejudices, wants, we need to move past a
model of privacy as access and towards a model of privacy as power.164 When
Ontario’s consumer protection laws are purposively enforced in a way that
recognizes the imbalance of power in modern consumer-business relationships,
users may be more likely to trust firms’ privacy promises, which may in turn
increase the incentives for firms to compete harder on privacy.165 This will not
happen without consensus ad idem on the legitimate purposes of collecting and
sharing consumer information. Lacking this renewed commitment to consumer
protection, neoliberalism, disguised as Internet exceptionalism and enabled by
the historic immunity provided to the consumer reporting industry, will continue
to commodify and exploit consumer data in an unregulated environment.
163 Lisa Austin, ‘‘Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, Not Consent (or
Harm)” in Austin Sarat, ed, A World Without Privacy?: What Can/Should Law Do,
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524512> at 7.
164 Ibid.
165 Stucke & Grünes, supra note 118 at 326.
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